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Respondents Sheet M€ital Systems and Transamerica 
Premier Insurance (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sheet 
Metal Systems") file this response to Utah Tile and Roofing and 
CNA Insurance Company's (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Utah Tile")'s Petition for Review on appeal from the Industrial 
Commission of Utah ("Commission"). 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) (1997), § 63-
46b-16(l) (1997), and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996), 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. ISSUE. The issue is whether to affirm the 
Commission7s decision that Kevin Day's accident of December 7, 
1993 while working for Sheet Metal Systems did not amount to an 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion," and thus was not the legal 
cause of any resulting injury. This issue is analyzed and 
reviewed in two steps: 
First, the agency must determine as a matter 
of fact exactly what were the employment-
related activities of the injured employee. 
Second, the agency must decide whether those 
activities amounted to an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. 
Hilton Hotel v. Indus. Comm'n, 897 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (quoting Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 731 P.2d 
1079, 1082 (Utah 1986)). Utah Tile's appeal addresses both 
steps, and each has its own stctndard of review. 
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2. STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW, The Court should 
show deference to the Commission's determinations on each part of 
the two-part review: 
A, Findings of Fact, The Commission's findings 
of fact as to the December 7, 1993 incident must be accepted if 
they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g) (1997). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla 
of evidence, but less than the weight of the evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Rev., 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
B. Application of the Law. The Commission's 
conclusion that the December 7, 1993 incident was not an "unusual 
or extraordinary exertion" is a mixed question involving the 
application of the law to the facts. Price River, 731 P.2d at 
1082; accord Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 
181 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Smith & Edwards Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 
770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Commission's 
decision on this issue, and particularly in this case, should be 
given substantial deference according to recent cases from the 
Utah Supreme Court, Utah Court of Appeals, and to past cases in 
point. See, e.g.. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181-84 
(Utah 1997); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); 
Caporoz v. Indus. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
Stouffer, 801 P.2d at 181. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
The determinative statutes and regulations are 
adequately set forth on pages 2-3 of Utah Tile/s brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The nature of the ceise and course of proceedings are 
adequately described on pages 3-5 of Utah Tile's brief. 
Statement of Facts 
Kevin Day had four back injuries or recurrences from 
March 18, 1992 to December 7, 1993. (R. 567-69.) The first 
three occurred while he was employed with Utah Tile. (R. 565-
67.) The fourth, on December 7, 1993, occurred while he was 
employed by Sheet Metal Systems. (R. 568.) 
Mr. Day's first injury on March 18, 1992 occurred when 
he was working for Utah Tile, helping another employee lift a 
3 00-pound roll of rubber from the ground to the roof of a 
building when he felt two "excruciating" pops in his back, 
dropped his rope, and fell back onto his buttocks. (R. 264, 283, 
318.) He reported the injury and sought and obtained medical 
treatment. (R. 567.) 
Mr. Day's second injury occurred on March 23, 1992, 
when he was lifting a piece of sheet metal with Utah Tile. (Id.) 
His third injury occurred on January 13, 1993, when he 
slipped and fell carrying a load of sheet metal for Utah Tile. 
He testified that he lay on his back for about an hour because of 
the pain. (Id.) 
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Significantly, on October 27, 1993, Mr. Day reported 
that his back pain had not disappeared since his first injury in 
March 1992, and his examining physician, Dr. John Schlegel, M.D., 
noted that Mr. Day's signs and symptoms were consistent with a 
discogenic pain pattern and recommended an MRI scan. (R. 568.) 
Prior to that MRI being taken, however, Mr. Day had the incident 
on December 7, 1993 with Sheet Metal Systems. 
Utah Tile's statement that Mr. Day "seriously injured" 
his back on December 7, 1993, Petr.'s Br. at 6, is unsupported by 
the record. There has been no such finding by the ALJ, the 
medical panel, or the Commission. Such a statement is simply 
calculated to try to influence the Court's perception of 
Mr. Day's incident of December 7, 1993, since it is the 
"exertion" related to that incident that is at issue. 
A medical panel was convened to resolve medical aspects 
. . . t 
of this case and its findings were adopted by the ALJ and the 
Commission. (R. 571, 624.) The panel concluded, among other 
things, that "[Mr. Day's] initial injury on March 18, 1992 began 
the sequence of problems from which he continues to have 
difficulties." (R. 569.) The medical panel further concluded 
that "it is impossible to determine specifically the date of 
onset of the first L5-S1 abnormality." (R. 571.) Interestingly, 
however, the medical panel report includes the following 
description of Mr. Day's December 7, 1993 incident with Sheet 
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Metal Systems, purportedly based on Mr, Day's representations to 
the panel: 
"He describes sitting down on the roof and 
letting himself down to the ground, . . ." 
(R. 548) (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Tile/s appeal fails for two simple reasons. 
First, the Commissions findings of fact on the December 7, 1993 
incident are well-supported by substantial evidence — chiefly, 
(1) Mr. Day's own testimony, cind (2) a physical demonstration by 
defense counsel during the heatring which, according to Mr. Day, 
was "exactly" like what he did on December 7, 1993. No 
objections were made to the demonstration at the hearing, and 
since it cannot be "reviewed" through the written transcript, it 
must be presumed to support the Commission's findings. 
Second, the Commissions application of the "unusual or 
extraordinary exertion" standard to the facts is sustainable 
under any standard of review. The Commission should be given 
discretion and deference to apply this legal standard, and 
particularly in the present case because of the potential 
significance to the outcome of the demonstrative evidence at the 
hearing, which is not reviewable through the appellate record. 
In any event, the Commissions conclusion that a drop of 
effectively 18 inches — a finding supported by substantial 
evidence — is not an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is 
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plainly reasonable and correct. Utah Tile fails to provide 
argument or authority which support a different result from that 
reached by the ALJ and the Commission. The order of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DECEMBER 7, 1993 
INCIDENT WAS NOT AN "UNUSUAL OR EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION" 
The issue on appeal is whether the Commission correctly 
found no "unusual or extraordinary exertion," and thus no legal 
causation, in connection with Mr. Day's December 7, 1993 incident 
with Sheet Metal Systems.1 There are two steps to the analysis: 
First, the agency must determine as a matter 
of fact exactly what were the employment-
related activities of the injured employee. 
Second, the agency must decide whether those 
activities amounted to an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. 
Hilton, 897 P.2d at 355 (quoting Price River. 731 P.2d at 1082). 
A. The Commission7s findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence. 
The Commission adopted the factual findings of the ALJ. 
(R. 624.) Those findings need only be supported by "substantial 
1
 Under Utah worker 's compensation law, for an "injury" to 
be compensable, there must be "proof of a causal connection 
between the injury and the worker's employment duties," which 
requires proof of both "legal causation" and "medical causation." 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. In Allen, the Court said, "where a 
claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition which contributes 
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required 
to prove legal causation." Id. (emphasis added). 
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evidence," not the weight of the evidence, to be upheld. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
Utah Tile's main complaint is that it claims there is 
no evidence that Mr. Day actually lowered himself toward the 
ground from his four-foot perch to reduce the distance of his 
jump, hop, fall, dismount, or whatever. Thus, it contends that 
the Commission found in error that the "effective" height of the 
jump was 18 inches, or one and a half feet. (R. 568, 624.) 
To the contrary, there are at least two sources of 
substantial evidence supporting the Commission's findings in this 
regard: (1) Mr. Day's direct testimony; and (2) a physical 
demonstration by Mr. Tom Sturdy, counsel for Sheet Metal Systems 
at the hearing on this matter, found in the same passage. 
Specifically, Mr. Sturdy climbed up onto a table or ledge to 
discuss with Mr. Day "how you actually jumped down off of this" 
(R. 315): 
Q. BY MR. STURDY: So you are on this roof; is 
that right? 
JUDGE SIMS: We'll bill you if there are any 
footprints. 
MR. STURDY: I'll come back with my Windex 
and clean it, Your Honor. 
Q. And so one of the theories, I suppose, is 
that you just jumped down from this height, four feet 
up, but that's not how it happened? 
A. No. 
Q. You squatted down on your hands and then 
jumped like this; is that right? 
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A. Exactly, How did you know that? 
Q. I asked you in your deposition. 
A. Okay. 
Q. How long are your legs? 
A. My legs are probably not more than 50 inches. 
Q. No, your inseam. 
A. Oh, my inseam? 
Q. Your wife may know. 
A. 32 inches. 
Q. All right. So you have a 32-inch inseam. So 
when vou are at this point on your hands and jumped 
down, your legs pretty much covered the distance for 
you, didn't they? 
A. Just about. 
Q. So you've got about a four-foot height. 
That's 48 inches, 32-inch inseam, and vou dropped 
actually about 16 inches; is that right? 
A. That sounds right. 
(R. 315-17.) (emphasis added). 
Utah Tile argues that because Mr. Day never said he 
brought his legs to a complete stop while they were 18 inches of 
the ground, the "physical reality" of his maneuver must have been 
equivalent to a four-foot jump. However, the "exertion" related 
to Mr. Day's descent and landing in the soft dirt below would 
have necessarily been a function of several things, including to 
what extent he may have dangled his legs over the side before 
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dropping, or to what extent he used his arms to slow his descent, 
or how he landed with his feet and knees. 
The best evidence of how Mr. Day exited from the four-
foot roof was the live demonstration by Mr. Sturdy, since Mr. Day 
said it resembled his actions "exactly." (R. 316.) The 
demonstration, however, is not subject to review on appeal. 
However, the ALJ clearly witnessed the demonstration, and such 
evidence appears to have influenced the ALJ's findings of fact, 
which were adopted by the Commission: 
7. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Day used his hands 
to assist him in getting off a four feet high wall 
while working for Sheet Metal Systems. He squatted 
down, placed the palms of his hands on either side of 
his feet, and used his hands and arms to lower his body 
straight down to the ground which was soft because it 
had been plowed. He claims that this injured his back. 
The evidence shows that the effective height from which 
he jumped was about one and one-half feet. The 
applicant argued that this was a jump from four feet. 
The evidence shows that it was clearly not a clean jump 
from four feet, and that Mr. Day used his hands and 
arms to assist him to lower himself to the ground from 
the four foot height. 
(R. 568, 624) (emphasis added). 
Sheet Metal Systems submits that between Mr. Day's 
testimony and Mr. Sturdy's demonstration, which must be presumed 
to have supported the ALJ's findings since it cannot be reviewed 
on appeal, there was ample evidence supporting the Commission's 
findings. 
-9-
B. The Commission reasonably and correctly applied 
the "unusual or extraordinary exertion" standard 
to the facts of this case. 
Utah Tile also challenges the Commission's application 
of the "unusual and extraordinary exertion" standard to the 
facts. Utah Tile's arguments almost exclusively start from the 
premise that Mr. Day was injured by a four-foot jump, not, as the 
Commission and ALJ found, by a drop effectively of about 18 
inches. Nowhere does Utah Tile argue that a drop of about 18 
inches would be an "unusual or extraordinary exertion."2 Thus, 
if the Court upholds the Commission's finding that Mr. Day's drop 
on December 7, 1993 was effectively about 18 inches (into soft 
dirt with a good landing) — which is supported by Mr. Day's own 
testimony — then no further analysis is necessary to affirm the 
Commission. 
If the Court finds the evidence not to uphold the 
finding of an effective drop of 18 inches, or if Utah Tile 
challenges such finding as constituting an "unusual or 
extraordinary exertion" in any event, then Court must review the 
Commission's application of the standard to the facts. In doing 
so, recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court 
2
 Such a drop could be compared to a number of typical 
nonemployment activities, such as stepping off a step stool, 
hopping off a bus, climbing out of a pickup truck or sport-
utility vehicle, or skipping the last stair on a walk down the 
stairs. 
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suggest giving substantial deference to the Commission/s 
decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently analyzed standards of 
review in Drake, 939 P.2d at 181-84, and suggested that even if 
the standard is one of "correctness" in the abstract, the 
application of certain legal standards to facts may properly 
"convey a measure of discretion to [the Commission] when applying 
that standard to a given set of facts." Id. at 182 (quoting 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). The Pena case, which Drake follows, 
identified "three reasons that are useful in discerning when some 
degree of discretion ought to be left to [the Commission]:" 
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is 
to be applied are so complex and varying that 
no rule adequately addressing the relevance 
of all these facts can be spelled out; 
(ii) when the situation to which the legal 
principle is to be applied is sufficiently 
new to the courts that appellate judges are 
unable to anticipate and articulate 
definitively what factors should be outcome 
determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge 
has observed "facts," such as a witness 's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record available 
to the appellate courts. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39 (emphasis added). In Drake, the Court 
found the first two reasons relevant to the "special errand" rule 
and, consequently, gave "heightened deference to the Commission," 
according "a strong presumption" that the Commission's decision 
was correct. Drake, 939 P.2d at 182, 184. 
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The same result is appropriate for decisions under the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" standard, and in any event, 
the Court should grant particular deference to the Commission's 
result in this case in light of the strong presence of the third 
factor described in Pena: the ALJ's opportunity to observe 
"facts" and "evidence" that cannot be ascertained from the 
appellate record. (R. 315-17.) As discussed above, the ALJ's 
opportunity to observe Mr. Sturdy's demonstration, which Mr. Day 
endorsed as an "exact" reproduction of his December 7, 1993 
incident, puts the ALJ and Commission in a position in applying 
the legal standard to the facts that the reviewinq court cannot 
replicate. 
Consequently, pursuant to Drake, the Commission's 
conclusion finding Mr. Day's incident with Sheet Metal Systems 
not to have been a compensable accident should be granted 
substantial deference and a "strong presumption" of correctness. 
See Drake, 939 P.2d at 184. 
Similarly, though not applying the Drake/Pena analysis, 
the Utah Court of Appeals' most recent statement of the standard 
for reviewing the Commission's application of the law to facts 
also applied a deferential standard — looking only to ensure 
that the Commission's decision falls within the "broad bounds of 
reasonableness." Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 144. In Caporoz, the 
panel applied the Morton analysis of agency review, see Morton 
Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1991), 
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which looks for an explicit or implicit grant of discretion to 
the agency. The panel unanimously held that the Commission is 
explicitly granted broad discretion in its "application of the 
law to facts" (as distinguished from "interpreting the law") 
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16(1) (1994) (renumbered § 34A-1-301 
(1997)). Thus, while using slightly different terminology, the 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court are basically consistent in 
granting deference to the Commissions application of the law to 
specific facts.3 
To the extent Utah Tile may argue for a nondeferential 
review by suggesting a "correction-of-error" review and citing 
Drake and Crapo v. Indus. Common, 922 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), see Petr's Br. at 1, Utah Tile has the wrong standard. 
As discussed above, the articulation of a "correctness" standard 
in Drake only began the analysis, which resulted in substantial 
deference to the Commission and its application of the "special 
errand" rule. 939 P.2d at 181-84. 
Meanwhile, there are several problems with relying on 
Crapo for the standard of review. First, a more recent panel of 
3
 Historically, Utah courts have applied a deferential 
standard of review to the Commission7s application of the 
"unusual and extraordinary exertion" standard. See, e.g., 
Stouffer, 801 P.2d at 181 ("reasonable and rational" standard); 
Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(same); Sisco Hilte v. Indus. Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (same); see also American Roofing v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("arbitrary and 
capricious" standard). 
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the Court of Appeals (including the author of Crapo) expressly 
declined to follow Crapo's statement of the standard of review. 
See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143 (Commission's application of the law 
should be reviewed only for "reasonableness"). Second, the cases 
Crapo relies upon for the standard of review — Cross v. Board of 
Review, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and King v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) — were expressly 
distinguished and not followed by the more recent Caporoz. 945 
P.2d at 143. Third, the other two judges on the Crapo panel also 
have joined an opinion conflicting with Crapo on the standard of 
review. See VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) (Commission's application of the law should be 
reviewed for "reasonableness"). 
Similarly, Utah Tile's reliance on Miera v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986) is also misplaced. Utah Tile 
incorrectly suggests that there is "nothing in the reasoning of 
Miera to suggest that the number of jumps was particularly 
significant." Petr's. Br. at 20. To the contrary, the only 
reasoning in Miera concerning the application of the "unusual and 
extraordinary exertion" standard referred to the frequency of 
jumps, a fact simply not present and substantially 
distinguishable from the facts as found by the Commission in this 
case. See Miera, 728 P.2d at 1025 ("His jumps into an eight-foot 
hole from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute intervals 
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constitute a considerably greater exertion than that encountered 
in non-employment life and are therefore legally sufficient.11). 
Utah Tile fails to provide argument or authority which 
support a different result from that reached by the ALJ and the 
Commission. The order of the Industrial Commission should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments Respondents request 
that the Order of the Industrial Commission be affirmed. 
DATED this 1£- day of December, 1997. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
2^L \^£/^^^ 
Eric D. Barton 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Sheet Metal Systems and 
Transamerica Premier Insurance 
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